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Abstract   This paper surveys empirical studies that utilize the theory of the
firm and dual theory to reveal economic and technological conditions of fish
harvesting firms. The dual approach is highly suitable for revealing disaggre-
gated structures in fishing processes that consist of several inputs and outputs.
Building on the functional forms of cost, profit, or revenue functions, the dual
approach has improved our understanding of technological production condi-
tions based on data at firm level. This is done by addressing a variety of
different technological issues for multispecies harvesting firms, such as trans-
formation between species, substitution between fishing inputs, economies of
scope and scale, industrial organization, etc. Moreover, the approach has been
useful as a means of providing information on public management of resource
exploitation by dealing with various regulatory regimes; i.e., input management,
output management, and prospects for future regulation. The purpose of this pa-
per is to review theoretical issues and empirical results with respect to fishing
gear and regulatory regimes.
Key words   Survey, dual approach, production theory, fish harvesting technol-
ogy, multiproduct firm.
JEL Classification Codes   Q21, Q22, D23.
Introduction
The public management of marine fisheries is often seen as the only possible means
of preventing overexploitation of our fish resources. In order to assess the conse-
quences of regulations, regulators need detailed knowledge of the technologies
employed in a fishery. This is because the success or failure of a given regulatory
system depends on how firms with given technological features respond to regula-
tion. For example, output regulation might mean that firms will alter their
harvesting strategies to catch different species, or alternatively that they will reduce
their fishing effort, or some combination of these two options might be introduced.
In general, different economic outcomes can be expected from the alternative re-
sponses. It needs to be emphasized that the economic consequences of a policy
depend critically on the technological profiles of the firms that participate in the
fishery concerned. Therefore, for the regulator it is valuable to make assessment of
the technological and economic conditions before a given policy is imposed.
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Detailed knowledge of the technological and economic conditions that apply to
fishing firms can be obtained by employing the dual approach. This means that in-
formation about profit, cost, and revenue functions at the firm level is used to
describe technological conditions in the production process. The purpose of this pa-
per is to review the different theoretical issues and empirical results across fishing
gears as revealed by use of the dual approach to fish harvesting firms. Shumway
(1995) and Fox and Kivanda (1994) illustrate the prominent position of the dual ap-
proach in revealing production conditions in agriculture. This paper shows that by
applying neoclassical production theory on fisheries, the dual approach has enabled
fishery economics to become a part of applied microeconomics rather than to exist
on its own ad hoc basis.
The disaggregated technological structure is a central topic that is clarified in
the dual applications, thus uncovering detailed relationships between inputs and out-
puts in the production process. Most fish harvesting firms are multiproduct; i.e.,
they produce several outputs by means of a range of different inputs. This means,
for example, that the firm’s aggregated fishing effort consists of disaggregated input
components, such as vessel tonnage, engine power, technological equipment, fishing
gear, and crew. The disaggregated structure of fishing effort is addressed by identi-
fying the relationships between individual input components by, for example, stating
their substitution or complementary relationships. The disaggregated view of the
production process opens up the possibility of performing a variety of different
analyses of the applications; e.g., the transformation between outputs of the
multiproduct firm (see Squires 1987a,b,c; Kirkley and Strand 1988), the input de-
mand of the multiproduct firm (Dupont 1990; Squires 1987a), the cost structure of
multiproduct firms (Squires 1988; Squires and Kirkley 1991), and the industrial organi-
zation of the fishing industry (see Lipton and Strand 1992; Campbell and Nicholl
1995). Moreover, the dual approach reveals technological conditions under different
regulatory regimes; e.g., output-regulated firms (Bjørndal and Gordon 2000;
Weninger 1998), input-regulated firms (Dupont 1991), or the prospects ex ante of
imposing trip quotas (Squires and Kirkley 1991, 1996; Segerson and Squires 1993).
The Dual Approach: Outline and Assumptions
Neoclassical production theory employs two different ways of obtaining knowledge
of the technological structure of a firm. The primal approach refers to the optimiza-
tion problem in which the technological condition is derived explicitly from the
production function. The dual approach denotes the optimization problem in which
technological properties are derived by employing the envelope theorem, based, for
instance, on the profit function. Diewert (1974) and McFadden (1978) show that the
primal and the dual approaches represent two different ways of expressing the same
technological conditions, and there is no theoretical difference regarding which ap-
proach is employed to measure the properties of the technology.
Campbell (1991), Hannesson (1983), and Robinson and Pascoe (1996) use the
primal approach to describe the technological properties in the fish harvesting in-
dustry. A problem with using this approach to describe harvesting technology is that
the regressors of input quantities are often highly collinear, which may cause
multicollinearity problems in the estimation. Simultaneity bias may also be a prob-
lem of the primal approach when it is doubtful whether the input quantities are
exogenous in the production process (Hoch 1958).1 By employing prices as regres-
1 The Hausmann test can be employed to test variable exogeneity of the regressors (see Hausmann 1978).Applications of Dual Theory in Fisheries 311
sors, the dual approach offers a complementary approach that is highly suitable for
dealing with problems of the input quantities. However, this does not mean that the
dual approach is without problems; for example, insufficient price variability may
cause problems in estimating technological properties. The remuneration system in
the fishing industry, whereby the crew takes a share of the total catch value, may
also cause problems of simultaneity bias. An advantage of the dual approach is that
it builds on price data, which are often more readily available and accurate than
quantity data. The dual approach has the advantage of being easy to use in modeling
multiproduct technology properties. Pope (1982) argues that no first-order condi-
tions require to be solved when applying the dual approach. This means that a broad
range of functional forms can be employed by the dual approach. Additional argu-
ments for and against the dual approach can found in Binswanger (1974), Lopez
(1982), and Shumway (1995).
In modeling fishing technology, it is crucial that the applied theoretical model
should agree with the behavioral hypothesis and market conditions of the firm. Ap-
plications of the dual approach in the fishing industry utilize three different sets of
behavioral hypotheses and accompanying objective functions to describe firm be-
havior. These are: profit maximization, input constrained revenue maximization, and
output constrained cost minimization.
Squires (1987a,b,c), Alam, Ishak, and Squires (1996, 2002), and Salvanes and
Squires (1995) employ the multiproduct profit function, π (p,w) to describe the
profit-maximizing firm expressed by:
π (, ) . pw M a xp y w x =− {}
It is assumed that the firm is a price-taker in the input and output markets. The firm
determines the demand for inputs, x, and supply of outputs, y, based on perceived
input and output prices denoted by w and p, respectively. The regularity properties
imply that π (p, w) is nonnegative, nondecreasing in p, nonincreasing in w, positively
and linearly homogeneous, convex, and continuous (p,w).
Kirkley and Strand (1988), Squires and Kirkley (1991), Campbell and Nicholl
(1995), Diop and Kazmierczak (1996), and Thunberg, Bresnyan, and Adams (1995)
employ revenue maximizing behavior to describe the short-run multiproduct supply
structure at given levels of inputs. In the short run, inputs are fixed and the firm
maximizes the revenue function:
R p x Max py x (,) ; . = {}
The firm is a price taker in the output markets, and the inputs are fixed at their short-
run levels. The output supply is conditioned on perceived output prices, p. The
regularity conditions imply that R(p, x) is nondecreasing in p, positively and linearly ho-
mogeneous in p, convex and continuous in p, nondecreasing in x, and nonnegative.
Bjørndal and Gordon (2000), Lipton and Strand (1992), and Weninger (1998) all
use the behavioral hypothesis of cost minimization to describe firms operating under
output regulation. The output-constrained firm minimizes the cost function:
C w y Min wx y (,) ; . = {}
Such firms are assumed to base their input demand on the input prices for given out-
put levels. The regularity properties imply that C(w, y) is positive for y > 0,Jensen 312
nondecreasing in w, concave and continuous in w, positively and linearly homoge-
neous in w, nondecreasing in y, and C(w, 0) = 0.
It is essential to ascertain that the employed behavioral hypothesis correctly
specifies the features of the multiproduct firm. The profit function is an appropriate
specification with which to address the behavior of firms that alter their input de-
mand and output supply compositions on the basis of exogenous market prices for
inputs and outputs, while the revenue function is more suitable for studying short-
term behavior; e.g., that based on fishing trip data where inputs are assumed to
fixed, but the species composition can be varied. Cost minimization is a relevant op-
tion for describing firms that vary their input compositions, while output supply
functions are restricted and vertical; e.g., due to output regulation or biological con-
straints. However, employing the cost function when it is questionable that outputs
are restricted for the firm raises the question of whether outputs are exogenous or
not. In cases in which outputs are endogenous for the firm, dealing with outputs as if
they were exogenous outputs creates a simultaneity bias. For this reason, if not all
outputs are exogenous for the firm, then employing a revenue or profit function
might provide a better description of its behavior.
Separability in Inputs/Outputs of the Multiproduct Firm
Fishing technologies are often multidimensional because several production inputs
are employed to catch different species. The dual approach is highly suitable for ac-
quiring immediate and detailed knowledge of the technological conditions of a
multidimensional production process. The complexity of multidimensional produc-
tion technology can be reduced if it is possible to aggregate inputs or outputs into
subsets. Input-output separability is the aggregation concept most often addressed in
studies of fishing technologies. The concept indicates whether input and output
compositions are independent. The results shown in table 1 indicate that input-out-
put separability is rejected for most fisheries and for various types of fishing gear.
This invokes the dilemma that important technological structures may be overlooked
if the disaggregated structure of inputs and outputs is not taken into account.
The necessary conditions for input-output separability for the profit-maximizing
firm are δ (xi/xj)/δ p = 0 and δ (yi/yj)/δ w = 0 (see Chambers 1994). The first condition
implies that output prices, p, do not influence the composition of inputs xi and xj.
The second condition means that the input prices, w, will not affect the composition
of outputs yi and yj. Rejecting input-output separability means that a change in input
(output) price alters the relative composition of output (input) quantities.2 The sur-
vey indicates that the majority of fishing technologies should be modeled in a
disaggregated context. Aggregated modeling of harvesting conditions involves the po-
tential error of misspecification, where the relationship between input composition and
output composition is ignored. In a management setting, the results of input-output
separability indicate that imposed regulation of aggregated output means that high-
value species will be targeted (highgrading). Furthermore, rejecting input-output
separability means that imposed input management might, for example, alter catch
composition for the firm. Generally speaking, the results of tests of input-output
separability speak in favor of disaggregated modeling of fishing technologies.
2 In the studies of Kirkley and Strand (1988), Campbell and Nicholl (1995), Thunberg, Bresnyan, and
Adams (1995), Squires and Kirkley (1991), and Diop and Kazmierczak (1996), fishing effort is mea-
sured through the use of a single composite input, thereby implicitly assuming that inputs are separable
from outputs. In these applications, the test on input-output separability is, therefore, only addressing
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Evidence in favor of accepting separability is found in a few cases. Alam, Ishak
and Squires (1996) find no evidence to reject input-output separability in the gill net
fishery of Peninsular Malaysia in the short run. This implies that inputs and outputs
can be aggregated into theoretically consistent variables consisting of a single ag-
gregated input and a single aggregated output. This implies that a quantity restric-
tion on a single output will reduce the input and output at the aggregated level, but
that the mix of single elements of inputs and outputs will remain the same. Aggrega-
tion over some variables permits substantial simplifications to be made in the eco-
nomic modeling of the fishery, as it permits the analysis to be undertaken using
fewer estimated relationships.
In two studies of New England otter trawl technology, Squires (1987a,b) indi-
cates different separability results. Building on identical data, the diversity in the
separability results of studies probably arises from slightly different output group
specifications. The separability test in Squires (1987b) indicates that roundfish (cod
and haddock) and flatfish (yellowtail and other flounders) are weakly separable sub-
groups, and input-output separability is rejected. Weak separability means that the
marginal transformation between cod and haddock does not depend on inputs or out-
puts outside the subset. Squires (1987a) does not reject input-output separability for
Table 1
Test for Separability
Study Gear Functional Form Separability1 Details
Alam, Ishak, and Gill net Translog profit Accept, Input-output separability is
Squires (1996) Reject accepted but global
separability is rejected.
Alam, Ishak, and Trawl Translog profit Reject Input-output separability and
Squires (2002) global separability are rejected.
Campbell and Purse seine, Leontief revenue Reject Input-output separability is
Nicholl (1995) long line rejected.
Diop and Trawl Leontief revenue Reject Input-output separability is
Kazmierczak (1996) rejected.
Kirkley and Strand Trawl Leontief revenue Reject Input-output separability is
(1988) rejected.
Salvanes and Trawl Translog profit Reject Rejects input-output separability
Squires (1995) and weak separability between
cod and haddock.
Squires (1987a) Trawl Translog profit Accept Input-output separability is
accepted.
Squires (1987b) Trawl Translog profit Reject, Input-output and global
Accept separability is rejected, but
weak separability between
cod and haddock is accepted.
Squires and Kirkley Trawl Leontief revenue Reject Input-output separability is
(1991) rejected.
Thunberg, Bresnyan, Gill net Translog revenue Reject Input-output separability is
and Adams (1995) rejected.
Weninger (1998) Surf clam Translog cost Reject Output separability is rejected.
and ocean
quahog vessels
1 Accept – H0: separability cannot be rejected; Reject – H1: separability is rejected.Jensen 314
otter trawler technology, thereby obtaining a result that differs from Squires (1987b).
On the basis of the information available in Squires (1987a,b), it is difficult to determine
exactly what causes the difference in the input-output separability tests, but the
specification of subgroups of outputs might be a reasonable explanation.
The specification of the output groups is often problematic in applied studies
because many firms do not catch certain species, which leaves a zero value on the
regressant. Using censored estimation might solve the problem of missing output
observations, but econometrics packages capable of dealing with this problem have
not been developed. Applied studies might instead aggregate output into groups
whereby the missing observation problem is avoided. Kirkley and Strand (1988),
Squires and Kirkley (1991), and Campbell and Nicholl (1994) overcome the statisti-
cal problem of zero catches of certain species by assigning them an arbitrarily small
value of 0.01 tons.3
Nonjointness in Inputs of the Multiproduct Firm
Fish stock regulation is often done by regulating individual species.4 Single-species
regulation is based on the assumption that distinct production functions for indi-
vidual species exist. However, separate regulation of species ignores the
transformation in output supply of the multiproduct firm. The condition of
nonjointness in inputs is central to the task of determining whether it is appropriate
to regulate the fishing industry in a single-species or multispecies context. A sum-
mary of studies that test for nonjointness is presented in table 2. The majority of
these studies rejects nonjointness in inputs for fishing technologies, thus suggesting
that imposed regulation will probably alter the multispecies composition of harvests.
Nonjointness in inputs determines whether or not a firm will maximize its pro-
duction for each output separately. If it maximizes each output separately, this
means that there is no interdependence among its production of the various outputs.
Hall (1973) set out a necessary condition for nonjointness in inputs for the profit
function as:







meaning that the firm maximizes the individual profit functions for each output.
This is the same as saying that its total profit from producing all outputs is the sum
of the profits generated by each output. Testing for nonjointness in inputs for the profit-
maximizing firm means that a change in the price of the single output will not affect









3 Problems encountered by employing the 0.01 values might be discovered by comparing sign and statis-
tical significance to estimates of the nonzero observations.
4 This is, for example, seen in the fisheries of the European Community, where the species are mainly
regulated in a single-species context by applying a total allowable catch (TAC) for each single species.
Although multi-species TACs (MSTAC) have been introduced by 3760/92 (see Council Regulation, Offi-
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which is a necessary condition for:
δδ yp i j ij =≠ 0, .
That is, a price change in the jth output will not affect the firm’s output supply of
the ith nonjoint output.
The tests for nonjointness in inputs reveals that results differ, depending on the
fishing gear employed. For trawlers, the null-hypothesis of nonjointness in inputs is
rejected in most studies. This is not surprising, since trawl gear is designed for har-
vesting a wide range of species. In a management setting, the jointness in inputs implies
that individual regulation of species (for example through TAC) will also change the
quantity of other species landed by trawlers. This implies that fisheries managers need to
acknowledge the consequences that TAC regulation will have on a given species and the
effect they will ultimately have on other species landed by the firm. In order to allow
this to be done, the proper specification of the joint production technology contains
an explicit modeling of the transformation in production between different species.
Table 2
Test for Nonjointness in Inputs
Study Gear Functional Form Non-jointness1 Details
Alam, Ishak, and Gill net Translog profit Accept Nonjointness for all outputs
Squires (1996) cannot be rejected.
Alam, Ishak, and Trawl Translog profit Reject Nonjointness for all outputs
Squires (2002) is rejected.
Campbell and Purse seine, Leontief revenue Accept, Nonjointness is rejected for
Nicholl (1995) long line Reject purse seine (specialized
firms) and accepted for the
generalist firms.
Kirkley and Trawl Leontief revenue Reject Nonjointness for all species
Strand (1988) is rejected.
Salvanes and Trawl Translog profit Reject Rejects nonjointness for all
Squires (1995) outputs in common and for
each single output separately.
Segerson and Trawl Leontief revenue Reject Nonjointness for all outputs
Squires (1993) is rejected.
Squires (1987a) Trawl Translog profit Reject Nonjointness for all outputs
is rejected.
Squires (1987b) Trawl Translog profit Reject Nonjointness for all outputs
is rejected.
Squires and Trawl Leontief revenue Reject, Nonjointness is rejected for all
Kirkley (1991) Accept species expect for Dover sole.
Thunberg, Bresnyan, Gill net Translog revenue Reject Nonjointness for all outputs
and Adams (1995) is rejected.
Diop and Trawl Leontief revenue Reject Nonjointness for all species is
Kazmierczak (1996) rejected.
Weninger (1998) Surf clam Translog cost Accept Nonjointness in inputs cannot
and ocean be rejected.
quahog vessels
1 Accept – H0: Nonjointness in inputs cannot be rejected; Reject – H1: Nonjointness in inputs is rejected.Jensen 316
Failure to reject nonjointness in inputs for trawlers is seen in a single case.
Squires and Kirkley (1991) find that catches of Dover sole are a nonjoint production
in the Pacific coast trawl fishery, implying that Dover sole are harvested independently
of other species by trawlers. No intuitive explanation is given for the nonjointness of
Dover sole. However, a situation that might cause nonjointness in inputs occurs
when different species are harvested during different seasons of the year.
It is noteworthy that Weninger (1998) and Alam, Ishak, and Squires (1996) find
evidence for nonjointness in inputs for technologies in the mussel and gill net fish-
ery. This indicates an important difference between trawling, on the one hand, and
the technologies employed in mussel and gill net fisheries, on the other.
In the mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fisheries studied by Weninger,
the nonjointness in inputs indicates that these species are harvested independently.
This has the policy implication that surf clams and ocean quahogs might be regu-
lated independently, because no spillover effect of the regulation of one species
would be expected on the other species. In this sense, nonjointness in inputs tradi-
tionally legitimizes the individual regulation of species because they are harvested
independently in separate production processes.
However, the study of Alam, Ishak, and Squires (1996) indicates an exception
where it is inappropriate to regulate species individually, although nonjointness in
inputs is found in the fishery. The reason for this is that no evidence in favor of re-
jecting neither nonjointness in inputs nor input-output separability is found in the
Peninsular Malaysia gill net fishery examined. Therefore, there is an overlap in the
technology of both nonjointness in inputs and input-output separability (see Hall
1973). This implies that gill net technology consists of individual production func-
tions for each species, and in addition, that the production functions are identical
and scalar multiples of one another. This means that there is a consistent aggregated
output in fixed proportions, and the firm cannot alter its output mix. If the regulator
employs a single-species TAC, the gill netters will be forced to reduce all catches
proportionally in order to satisfy the regulation. In this sense, harvests of the indi-
vidual species cannot be regarded as being independent. However, regulation of a
single species might prove to be costly for the firm, because in order to satisfy the
regulations, the harvest of all species would have to be reduced. Instead, general
biomass management might be regarded as an alternative for such fisheries. Yet, em-
ploying biomass regulation would make it difficult to ensure the sustainable
development of species that are overexploited.
Modeling Biological Conditions Constraining the Multiproduct Firm
Modeling the technological conditions that affect individual fishing firms requires
biological conditions to be explicitly addressed. For the individual firm, the biologi-
cal conditions; e.g., resource abundance, affect the production environment, but the
single firm has no means of controlling stocks, which, therefore, must be treated as
exogenous. In this sense, as argued by Squires (1992, 1994a), treating stock abun-
dance as an input factor in the production process like capital, labor, or energy is
inappropriate in a positive, as opposed to a normative analysis based on the theory
of the firm. Biological conditions like stock abundance should rather be modeled as
an exogenous component that shifts the level of production. Most applications of the
dual approach use annual or seasonal dummy operators to measure fluctuations in
resource stocks (see Squires 1987a,b,c; Bjørndal and Gordon 1993; Salvanes and
Squires 1995; Campbell and Nicholl 1995; Squires and Kirkley 1996; Diop and
Kazmierczak 1996). A few applications employ indices to measure fluctuations in
stock abundance (see Bjørndal 1987; Dupont 1990; and Weninger 1998).Applications of Dual Theory in Fisheries 317
On the other hand, given that biological conditions constrain the behavior of the
firm, it is not sufficient to employ seasonal dummies in modeling the firm. Instead,
insufficient availability of stocks of individual species restricts the supply of this output
for the firm. This means that output supply of the particular species cannot be based on
exogenous output prices. Although biological conditions restrict the supply of a single
species, the assumption of profit or revenue maximization might still be appropriate
for the other outputs produced by the firm. The biologically restricted output should
be modeled by the restricted quantity in the profit function. On the other hand, if all
outputs of the firm are restricted by biological conditions, then it is not appropriate
to assume profit- or revenue-maximizing behavior. Instead, the firm is assumed to
minimize its production costs for given quantities of the restricted outputs.
Transformation between Outputs of the Multiproduct Firm
The condition of jointness in inputs found in most studies of trawl fisheries indi-
cates that there is dependence between production functions for the various outputs.
This has implications for fisheries management, because regulations imposed on
single species also have an impact on landings of other species. This follows be-
cause firms do not produce their catches of individual species as separate outputs,
but there are interactions in harvesting decisions regarding different species. For this
reason, regulators ought to take account of the technological ability of the firm to
alter its harvesting pattern within a given fishing season. One way to clarify the fea-
tures of joint production is to describe substitutions and complementary
transformations in output supply.
The output supply elasticities presented in table 3 are based on the assumption
that firms maximize their production supply based on exogenous market prices for
landings. The table discloses inelastic own-price elasticities in most studies, indicat-
ing that a 1% increase in the output price increases the output supply by less than
1%.5 The fairly small price reaction in output supply indicates rigidity in the firm’s
ability to alter its harvesting pattern in the short run. There are various reasons for
rigidity in harvesting patterns. Squires (1987c) stresses that search costs in exploit-
ing new species or fishing grounds imply rigidity in the harvesting pattern because
search costs outweigh the gain in revenue that could be obtained by the search.6 In-
sufficient price variability might be an empirical explanation for the inelasticity
given that the studies are based on cross-section data that cover a rather short time
span. Kirkley and Strand (1988) also argue that aggregation of outputs might cause
potential aggregation bias and thereby inelastic output supply elasticities. Further,
multi-collinearity might cause problems of inadequate variability in the output
prices and thus insignificant parameter estimates.
Cross-price supply elasticities reveal the interaction in the supply of different
outputs for the multiproduct firm. They also clarify an important technological dif-
ference between trawl and gill net technologies. For trawl technology, the
cross-price elasticities uncover a “flexible” fishery of both substitution and comple-
mentary relationships in the output supply of the various species (Hicksian
elasticities).7 For the gill net technology, all outputs are produced as complements.
5 There are two exceptions. Thunberg, Bresnyan, and Adams (1995) find an elastic short-run elasticity
for the output of mullet in the gill fishery of Florida. Squires (1987c) finds elastic long-run elasticities in the
otter trawl fishery of New England. The latter confirms that the elasticities are higher in the long run.
6 Search cost in the form of energy consumption, risk, quality deterioration for some species, opportu-
nity cost foregone, and labor cost.
7 The Hicksian elasticity measures the pure substitution effect (see Lopez 1984).Jensen 318
Although Thunberg, Bresnyan, and Adams (1995) is the only study to have revealed
cross-price elasticities for gill net technology, it is important to stress the difference
in results obtained for trawl and gill net technologies. The possibility of substituting
between outputs expressed for the trawl technology indicates that the firm switches
between targeting different species. In doing so, trawler technology involves a de-
gree of flexibility that may enable the firm to change its target species, for example,
as a result of regulations imposed on a particular species. This kind of flexibility is
not found in gill net fisheries, where outputs are produced as complements and it is
difficult for the firm to change its target species. In this sense, the gill net fishery is
characterized as a “key” fishery where one or two key species are targeted and other
species are harvested as bycatch.8,9
The feature of “key” or “flexible” fishery has implications for fisheries manage-




with Respect Own-price Cross-price Fishery
Study Gear to Outputs1 Elasticity Elasticities Featured by:
Kirkley and Trawl SH Inelastic Substitutes, Flexible
Strand (1988) complements catches
Alam, Ishak and Trawl SM Inelastic Mainly Inconclusive2
Squires (2002) complements
Salvanes and Trawl SM Inelastic3 Substitutes, Flexible
Squires (1995) complements catches
Squires (1987b) Trawl SM Inelastic Not reported Not reported
Squires (1987c) Trawl LM Elastic, Substitutes, Flexible
inelastic4 complements catches5
Segerson and Trawl SH Inelastic Substitutes, Flexible
Squires (1993) complements catches
Squires and Trawl SH Inelastic Substitutes, Flexible
Kirkley (1991) complements catches
Squires and Trawl SH Inelastic Substitutes, Flexible
Kirkley (1996) complements catches
Thunberg, Bresnyan, Gill net SH Elastic, Complements Key species
and Adams (1995) inelastic6
Diop and Trawl SH Inelastic Substitutes, Flexible
Kazmierczak (1996) complements catches
1 SM – short-run Marshallian, LM – long-run Marshallian, SH – short-run Hicksian, LH – long-run Hicksian.
2 The Marshallian cross-price elasticities indicate that the output effect dominates the substitution effect,
whereby increased landings of high- or medium-grade species will increase the landings of low-grade
species, indicating bycatch of low-grade species.
3 The own-price elasticities of the most important species, cod and haddock, are inelastic but insignificant.
4 The own-price elasticity for roundfish is elastic, but inelastic for flatfish and all other outputs.
5 Based on Allen elasticities.
6 The own-price elasticity for the “key species” is elastic.
8 If there are two ”key” species, they are produced as complements.
9 The inability to substitute between outputs is also found in the gill net fishery (Alam, Ishak, and
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complementary relationship that exists between outputs. This means that regulation
that restricts a single target species often implies that a firm has the option of in-
creasing its harvest of some other species. This possibility does not exist in “key”
species fisheries that consist of complementary outputs. Thus, in a “key” fishery, the
regulation of a single output implies that the firm will either discard the regulated
species or reduce its fishing effort, with the latter option reducing its total earnings.
Input Demand of the Multiproduct Firm
Restricting fishing effort is often put forward as a means of preventing over-
exploitation of stocks. However, effective effort management is hindered by the
multidimensionality of fishing efforts. Pearse and Wilen (1979) emphasize that the
successful reduction of fishing effort depends on the regulator’s ability to
simultaneously restrict all dimensions of fishing effort. Strand, Kirkley and
McConnell (1981) demonstrated the multidimensionality of fishing effort though the
marginal rate of substitution to plot isoquants between input pairs. The success of
imposed effort management depends on the disaggregated structure of fishing effort.
Employing the dual approach, the disaggregated structure of fishing effort is often
uncovered by addressing the own-price and cross-price elasticities of the input
demand functions summarized in table 4.
The firm’s use of inputs such as fuel, labor, technical equipment, etc., builds on
the exogenous market prices for these inputs. Deriving input demand functions can
be obtained for firms that minimize costs or maximize profits. However, input de-
mand function cannot be disclosed for firms seeking revenue maximization; e.g.,
during the fishing trip, because all inputs are fixed within this short period.
The results of the own-price elasticities reveal that input demand is influenced
by whether the fishery is regulated or not. For unregulated fisheries, Bjørndal and
Gordon (1993), Squires (1987abc), Alam, Ishak, and Squires (2002) find elastic
own-price elasticities for trawlers and purse seiners, while in the input-regulated
fishery studied by Dupont (1991), the own-price elasticities for the unrestricted in-
puts were inelastic.10 These results follow as a natural consequence of the Le
Chatelier effect; i.e., the regulatory restrictions imposed create rigidity in the pro-
duction process and thereby restrict the ability to alter composition of unrestricted
input components (see Lau 1976; Squires 1994b). In this sense, input regulations
will tend to reduce the flexibility (e.g., elasticities) of the unconstrained inputs com-
pared to an unregulated industry. This is also the case in the output-regulated fishery
studied by Weninger (1998) and Bjørndal and Gordon (2000). However, when re-
porting the inelastic own-price elasticities in the output-regulated fishery, it must be
emphasized that these are Hicksian elasticities.11 Hicksian elasticities will normally
be smaller than Marshallian elasticities. This follows because Hicksian elasticities
do not incorporate the reduction in production that follows an increase in input
price.
The cross-price elasticities reveal the internal structure among disaggregated
factors that make up fishing effort. The cross-price elasticities presented include
both Hicksian and Marshallian elasticities.12 The Hicksian elasticities reported by
Squires (1987a) Weninger (1998), and Alam, Ishak, and Squires (2002) show substi-
10 Bjørndal and Gordon report the own-price elasticity on fuel, which varies on a yearly basis between
–0.713 and –1.108.
11 The Hicksian elasticities, or constant output demand function, is derived from the cost function.
12 The Marshallian and Hicksian elasticities of input build on the profit and cost functions, respectively.

















































































































SM – short-run Marshallian, LM – long-run Marshallian, SH – short-run Hicksian, LH – long-run Hicksian.
2
 Marshallian elasticity includes substitution and expansion ef
fects. Hicksian elasticity includes the pure substitution ef
fect (see Sakai 1974; Lopez 1984).
3
 Marshallian elasticities are elastic except for ener
gy in the east coast fishery
.
4
 Elasticity is estimated on an annual basis for several years.
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 Squires (1987c) estimates long-term elasticities from the restricted (short-run) profit function following the outline of Brow
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tution between input factors.13 This is not surprising since Hicksian elasticities mea-
sure the pure substitution effect between inputs at a given level of output. What is
more interesting is to observe that the Marshallian elasticities in Squires (1987b,c)
indicate a complementary relationship between capital, labor, and fuel in the otter
trawler fishery. This implies that imposing input regulation on the single input will
not be compensated for by increases in other inputs. The complementary Marshallian
elasticities indicate that the expansion effect outweighs the substitution effect; i.e., the
reduction in input demand that follows from a change in production level outweighs the
expected change in input demand due to the substitution effect. Dupont (1991) finds
a mixture of complementary and substitutional input demand relationships in the
Canadian seine and gill net troll salmon fishery, thereby revealing that individual
regulation of gears, fuel, or labor might be circumvented by substituting other in-
puts. Input management imposed on the gill and seiner fishery should, therefore, be
done by restrictions on the use of several inputs at the same time.
The Elasticity of Intensity
Another achievement of Dupont (1991) is to clarify the relationships between regu-
lated and unregulated inputs. This is accomplished by use of the elasticity of
intensity, which describes the impact that a change in a restricted input will have on
















where xi is the variable input that is conditioned on the output price, pv; input price,
w; and z. zi is the quantity of the restricted input. A negative elasticity indicates a
substituted relationship and a positive elasticity, a complementary one.
In the Canadian salmon fishery, both the number of fishing days and vessel ton-
nage are restricted by regulation. Based on the estimation of elasticity of intensity,
the study of Dupont (1991) reveals that restricting the number of fishing days is an
effective way to reduce the fishing effort for seiners and gill net-troll vessels, the
reason being that the vessels find it difficult to compensate for a restriction in num-
ber of fishing days through an increase in the unregulated input of fuel, labor, and
gear. Dupont suggests that estimates of elasticity of intensity could be used to
implement input limitation programs aimed at regulating inputs, which have few or
limited substitution possibilities, preventing fishermen from compensating for the
restricted input by increasing their use of unrestricted inputs.
The Cost Structure of Multiproduct Firm
Another important means of revealing the technological conditions of the
multiproduct firm is via its cost structure. The cost advantage of certain categories
of vessel may be a good indicator of competitive advantages; thus indicating which
13 Squires (1987a) reports the Allen partial elasticities as well as Marshallian elasticities. The Allen par-
tial elasticity is like the Hicksian elasticity, focusing on the pure substitution effect for the given level of
product. The Hicksian and Allen elasticities are related by α ij = ε ij/sj, where ε  and α  are the Hicksian and
Allen elasticities, respectively, and sj is the cost share of the jth input. The Allen partial elasticity sepa-
rates the relative impact of the price changes.Jensen 322
categories of vessel are most likely to survive in the future fleet structure. From a
normative view, management authorities might also use information about cost
structures for different vessel categories as an important building block in the indus-
trial organization of the fishing fleet. Certain applications of the dual approach are
devoted to revealing conditions for economies of scope and economies of scale. This
means revealing the extent to which diversity in outputs embodies cost savings com-
pared to specialized production plants, or whether relative cost savings in expanding
the scale of outputs exist. A summary of the applications that reveal cost structures
of harvesting technologies is presented in table 5.
The economies of scope reveal whether cost advantage exists in producing sev-
eral outputs or not. The definition of economies of scope follows from the
condition: C(yT) + C(yv–T) > C(yv), where C(.) is a cost function and T is a subset of v
(see Baumol, Panzar, and Willig 1982). The condition means that producing outputs
yT and yy–T in separate productions results in higher costs than employing a joint pro-
duction of yT and yy–T.14
The results of economies of scope for fish harvesting technologies are ambigu-
ous. Squires (1987b,c and 1988) indicates that there is a discrepancy in the tests for
economies of scope for the otter-trawling fishery of New England. The reason for
the statistical discrepancy follows because different output compositions and fleet
categories are specified. Squires (1987b, 1988) undertake the most detailed specifi-
cations of output compositions and fleet categories, verifying the hypothesis of
economies of scope. In this sense, an aggregation bias in Squires (1987c) might ex-
plain why economies of scope are rejected in this study. The presence of economies
of scope in a fishery might be explained on the basis of seasonal harvest patterns or
the spatial distribution of different fish stocks that cause cost complementarity in
harvesting several outputs jointly.
Weninger (1998) rejects the idea that economies of scope are present in the mid-
Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fisheries, where fishermen are restricted by
output regulation. This result is not surprising, due to the condition of nonjointness
in inputs previously reported for these fisheries, indicating that surf clams and ocean
quahogs are produced in separate production processes. In this sense, cost
complementarity in harvesting the two species can be excluded.15 Moreover, the im-
posed output regulation might limit the possibility of achieving complementarity in
production, but might instead create a cost disadvantage in joint production due to the
Le Chatelier effect. In a management setting, imposing regulation, such as bycatch limi-
tation, may distort the complementarity of jointly harvested species, leading to increased
production costs. In this sense, imposed regulation has consequences for the cost struc-
ture of the firm, and thereby might distort cost efficiency and create cost disadvantages
for certain categories of vessel. Thus, regulation will have unintended impacts on
the relative competition between vessel categories operating in the fishery.
Other elements of the cost structure addressed in the applications are the con-
cepts of product-specific economies of scale and multiproduct economies of scale.
14 The economies of scope are satisfied for one of two reasons, either because of fixed costs or due to
weak cost complementarity. In the first case, fixed costs do not depend on the quantities of outputs pro-
duced, but do vary depending on which outputs are chosen. This means that the fixed costs of
multiproduct technology are less that the sum of costs from two specialized product technologies. Ex-
pressed by FT + Fv–T > Fv, where FT, Fv–T and Fv are the fixed costs when producing the submatrices of
output of {T}{v – T}, and {v}, respectively. Secondly, weak cost complementarity means that the mar-
ginal cost of producing the ith output will decrease with an increase in the production of the jth output.
Weak cost complementarity can be expressed by δ (δ C[.]/δ yi)/δ yj ≤  0, where C[.] denotes the
multiproduct cost function, and yi and yj denote the production of the ith and jth outputs.
15 Still, economies of scope cost could prevail due to sharing fixed costs in the harvesting of the two
species.Applications of Dual Theory in Fisheries 323
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The economies of scope are verified due to weak cost complementarity in a subset of outputs.
2
 Increasing for high-grade species on east and west coasts
 
and medium-grade species on east coast.
3
 Increasing for multiproduct returns to scale for spring-spawning herring and other catches.
4
 Constant returns to scale for finfish, decreasing returns to scale all other species.
5
 Increasing returns to scale for yellowtail flounder
, decreasing returns to scale for all other species.
6
 Decreasing returns to scale for roundfish and flatfish, increasing returns to scale for residual catches.
7
 Increasing returns to scale for flatfish, decreasing returns to scale for roundfish and other species.
8
 Constant returns to scale for thornyheads and other rockfish, decreasing returns to scale for all other
.
9
 Increasing returns to scale for surf clams and ocean quahogs.Jensen 324
The cost improvement due to product-specific economies of scale for the ith output,
Si(y), is based on the condition: Si(y) = AICi(y)/Ci. AICi(y) is the average incremental
cost and Ci is the marginal cost. The condition states that the firm experiences de-
creasing cost in producing the last unit of output i, if the marginal cost of producing
the last unit is less than the average incremental cost. This means that whenever
Si(y) > 1, the firm has an incentive to increase production. Likewise, the concept of
multiproduct returns to scale, SM(y), measures the development of costs for propor-
tional changes in all outputs and inputs.
The results of the product-specific economies of scale indicate that most species
are harvested under conditions of decreasing returns to scale. In the multiproduct
trawler fishery, increasing product-specific returns to scale is frequently found for
individual species, which makes these species vulnerable to overharvesting due to
decreasing marginal production costs. For the trawlers, the conditions of increasing
product-specific returns to scale and economies of scope often overlap (see e.g.,
Squires 1987b, 1988; Alam, Ishak, and Squires 2002). However, the development of
trawling specialized for harvesting a single species is unlikely because economies of
scope create cost advantage in jointly harvesting several species.
Increasing multiproduct economies of scale is rejected in most studies. However,
Bjørndal and Gordon (2000) and Weninger (1998) find indications of increasing
multiproduct returns to scale in the cases of the North Sea herring fishery and a mid-
Atlantic mussel fishery. In both studies, the behavior of the firm is restricted by output
regulation, meaning that they minimize their production costs. The results of increasing
economies of scale is expected, given that vessels minimize their costs by operating in
regions of increasing returns to scale. However, insufficient management of overall ca-
pacity might induce certain vessels to operate in regions of decreasing returns to scale.
As a curiosity, the cost structure also determines the extent to which a natural
monopoly will develop in the fishing industry. The condition necessary for a natural
monopoly to prevail is subaddivity of cost, which is expressed in the condition:
C(y) < iΣ kC(yi), where iΣ kyi = y. C(y) measures the cost of the single firm producing
y, and iΣ kC(yi) measures the aggregated cost of the k firms producing the output vec-
tor y. The condition means that if it is cheaper for a single firm to produce the output
vector y rather than distributing production over k different firms, a natural mo-
nopoly might be suitable.16
Squires (1998), and Alam, Ishak, and Squires (2002) reject for the presence of
cost subadditivity in trawler fisheries of New England and Malaysia, respectively.
Although economies of scope and scale in both fisheries are suggested, these conditions
are insufficient to satisfy the conditions required for a natural monopoly to exist, the rea-
son being that the technologies exhibit decreasing multiproduct returns to scale.
Moreover, it is indicated that the cost surfaces are not convex due to the absence of posi-
tive-definite diagonal elements measured in the Hessian submatrix of the cost function.
The lack of the appropriate cost data in output supply is often regarded as a hin-
drance to indicating the cost structure of the multiproduct firm. However, Squires
(1988) and Squires and Kirkley (1991) demonstrate that it is possible to reveal con-
ditions of economies of scope and scale based on information contained in the
revenue and profit functions. Building on findings by Sakai (1974), the relationship
between the cost function, C, and the long-term profit function, π , follows as:
16 A sufficient condition for cost subadditivity is the presence of transray convexity and ray
subadditivity. Transray convexity embodies cost convexity and economies of scope. These conditions
imply that when the monopoly changes its output composition and at the same time keeps the level of
some aggregate output fixed, costs will be lower for diverse, rather than specialized, output mixes. A
sufficient condition for ray subadditivity is increasing multiproduct returns to scale (see Baumol,
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δ 2C*[.]/δ yiδ yj = [δ 2π [.]/δ piδ pj]–1 “ i, j ε  M. This means that the inverse Hessian ma-
trix of the long-term profit function π  is identical to the Hessian matrix of the cost
function, C. Therefore, given that the profit function is in long-term equilibrium, the
conditions of the cost function can be revealed.
The Industrial Organization of the Fishing Industry
Welfare improvements resulting from reorganizing industrial structure are addressed
in different applications. Restructuring of the fishing fleet and reallocation of
catches between different categories of vessels are sources of welfare gains at the indus-
try level. The potential welfare gains are revealed by disclosing the specific production
conditions for vessels of different types and sizes. For example, conditions of economies
of scope and scale reveal whether a fleet containing specialized or generalized vessels is
efficient in the fishery (Lipton and Strand 1989). Inefficient fleet structures due to
overcapacity or an inefficient mixture of vessel categories are examined. An over-
view of the various applications on industrial organization is provided in table 6.
Different regulatory regimes are addressed in the applications. Each regulatory
regime imposes certain behavioral restrictions on the behavior of the firm. In the
output regulated industry, addressed by Lipton and Strand (1992) and Weninger
(1998), the firm is assumed to minimize its costs for predetermined outputs. Under
input regulation, examined by Dupont (1990), the firm is assumed to maximize
profit at given levels of regulated inputs.
Lipton and Strand (1992) and Weninger (1998) both find an inappropriate mix
of vessel categories and reluctant capacity in the mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean
quahog fisheries. Approaching different management regimes implies that there is a
discrepancy in recommendations regarding fleet structure in the two studies. Theo-
retically, the total harvesting capacity is derived from the imposed TAC regulation.
Lipton and Strand (1992) calculate the fleet capacity required under a limited-access
management regime. To be of value over a longer time horizon, the capacity recom-
Table 6
Industrial Organization of Harvesting Technologies
Regulatory Functional
Study Gear Regime1 Form Description
Campbell and Long line, None Leontief revenue Addresses reallocation of
Nicholl (1995) purse seine catch between vessel
groups in presence of a
stock externality.
Dupont (1990) Seine, gill net, Input regulation Quadratic profit Addresses rent dissipation
troll, gill net troll due to input regulation
based on Kulatilaka test.
Lipton and Surf clam and Output regulated Quadratic cost Compares open-access and
Strand (1992) ocean quahog limited-access management
vessels of in a fishery with a stock
different sizes externality.
Weninger (1998) Surf clam and Output regulation Translog cost Addresses the transition of
ocean quahog regulation from limited
vessels of entry to ITQ management.
different sizes
1 Addresses the regulatory regime predominating the firm behavior under study.Jensen 326
mendation of Lipton and Strand needs to be adjusted for productivity growth in the
industry, which is not done. The introduction of individual transferable quotas, ad-
dressed by Weninger (1998), implies that reluctant capacity due to productivity
growth is dealt with through the quota market. Vessels that do not achieve minimum
operating costs will earn a residual return that is less than the market lease in the
Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) market, and these firms will be bought out of
the market (Weninger and Just 1997). In this sense, an efficient ITQ market ensures
that reluctant capacity is bought out of the industry. The findings of Weninger
(1998) indicate diseconomies of scope, increasing returns to scale of variable cost,
and declining fixed costs for larger vessels. The transformation of regulation from
limited-access management to ITQ management leads to significant cost reductions
in the industry to be operated by large specialized vessels.
Dupont (1990) considers whether input regulation creates a non-optimal indus-
trial organization in a case study of the Canadian salmon fishery. The study rejects
the hypothesis that restrictions on vessel tonnage create a welfare loss in the indus-
try. The finding is based on a Kulatilaka test, indicating that there is no significant
difference between the actual level of regulated vessel tonnage and optimal vessel
tonnage.17 On the other hand, inappropriate fleet structures due to nonoptimal fleet
composition and reluctant fleet capacity are found in the fishery.18
Campbell and Nicholl (1995) address the connection between stock externality
and industrial organization in a case study of the yellowfin tuna fishery in the west-
ern Pacific. The stock externality implies that it is beneficial in terms of welfare to
reduce catches of juvenile fish by purse seine vessels in order to increase catches of
adult fish by longline vessels. A test on nonjointness in inputs for the purse seine
vessels indicates that they are multiproduct firms producing several outputs. Two
ways of reducing the multiproduct purse seiners’ catch of juvenile fish are ad-
dressed: a royalty tax on landings of yellowfin or an effort tax based on the number
of fishing days for the purse seiners.19
The empirical results indicate that the economic losses of the purse seiners will be
lower under a royalty tax than under an effort tax regulation. This follows due to
jointness in inputs, which implies that the impact of the royalty tax provides an incentive
for vessels to harvest non-taxed species. In contrast, the effort tax will reduce landings
of all species, thus resulting in lower effort and earnings than under the royalty tax.
Testing Capacity Utilization/Full Static Equilibrium of Quasi-fixed Input
Applications of the dual approach mainly outline the firm’s short-term behavior,
treating vessel capacity as quasi-fixed. The incentive for a firm to alter the quasi-
fixed input is addressed by analyzing capacity utilization or testing for full static
equilibrium of the quasi-fixed input. Comparing the observed level of the quasi-
fixed input with its optimal long-term level is an essential element in deriving
incentives for investment in the quasi-fixed input. The different applications that in-
vestigate capacity utilization/full static equilibrium are presented in table 7.
All applications specify GRT capacity (Gross Registered Tonnage) as the single
quasi-fixed input.20 The test of the quasi-fixed input is based on the behavior of the
17 The Kulatilaka test is described more carefully in the section that addresses testing of full static equi-
librium.
18 Reluctant fleet capacity is derived based on the TAC in the fishery.
19 If the production is characterized by diminishing marginal productivity of effort, the marginal cost of
reducing the fishing effort of each vessel will be less than reducing the number of fishing vessels.
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Accept means that the H
0
 hypothesis of complete capacity utilization/full static equilibrium of the quasi-fixed input cannot be rejected.
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The test is employed as based on Conrad and Unger (1987).
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The test is based on Kulatilaka (1985).
4
 See Morrison (1985).
5
 Segerson and Squires (1990) employ alternative tests of primal and dual concepts on capacity utilization.Jensen 328
firm in the short run; i.e., when vessel capacity is quasi-fixed.21 Applying the dual
approach to revenue, profit or cost functions can be accomplished to identify incen-
tives for the expansion or reduction of capacity. The test addresses the question of
whether the actual level of vessel tonnage is equal to the optimal long-term level.
The null hypothesis is that the observed vessel size is equal to the optimal level in
the long term. In the case that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, the firm has no
incentives to alter tonnage capacity. If the firm has an incentive to expand its capac-
ity, this has implications for the public management of fishing effort. Regulators
might consider limiting the aggregated fishing effort by restricting the number of
fishing vessels. To do so, there also needs to be an assessment of the firm’s incen-
tives to expand their individual capacity (size in GRT capacity). Ignoring the firm’s
incentives for capacity expansion might lead to underestimation of the realized
long-term fishing effort (number of vessels times GRT capacity) in the industry.
Mixed results of the capacity utilization/full static equilibrium are found. Alam,
Ishak, and Squires (1996) and Bjørndal and Gordon (1993) identify incentives for
capacity expansion for gill netters and purse seiners. Squires (1987c, 1988), Alam,
Ishak, and Squires (2002), and Dupont (1990) indicate no incentive of capacity ex-
pansion for trawlers, seiners, gill net vessels, and trollers. However, the survey does
not reveal any connection between fishing gear and incentives for capacity expan-
sion. Mere incentives for expansion of the firm’s capacity are closely related to
stock abundance and capital costs in the specific fishery. A weakness with regard to
identifying investment incentives in most applications is that these build on only
one to two years of data. To be relevant in a management setting, incentives for ca-
pacity expansion should remain in place for several years, since the adjustment of
fishing capacity is a long-term process (Jensen 1998). Bjørndal and Gordon (1993)
estimate the development of optimal vessel size over several years. Their study em-
phasizes the importance of conducting tests on full static equilibrium over several
years, and the results reveal substantial variations in predicted annual optimal vessel
size due to differences in the definition of the user cost of capital.
Several theoretical refinements of capacity utilization approaching conditions in
fisheries have been made. Segerson and Squires (1990) emphasize the straightfor-
wardness in defining the dual measure of capacity utilization for the multiproduct
fishing firm, whereas it is difficult to apply the primal measure of capacity utiliza-
tion to multiproduct firms. Segerson and Squires (1995) develop the capacity
utilization concept for the revenue-maximizing firm describing decisions made on
an individual fishing trip, where input composition during the trip is assumed to be
fixed. Segerson and Squires (1993) measure the capacity utilization under trip quota
regulation imposed ex ante on the individual fishing firm.
Ex ante Assessment of Production Quota on the Multiproduct Firm
Quantity restrictions on inputs or outputs are often proposed as a means of regulat-
ing fish harvesting. Imposed on the multiproduct firm, assessments of the behavioral
implications of quantity regulation are often complicated. Assessments of regulation
ex ante; i.e., before quantity regulation is imposed, is often demanded by regulators.
Different applications of the dual approach utilize ex ante assessments of quota
regulation that provide information about how the unregulated multiproduct firm
would react to quantity restriction. Impacts of production quota on output composi-
tion and investment incentives are among the aspects that are addressed. A summary
21 It is possible to address the situation where several inputs are quasi-fixed.Applications of Dual Theory in Fisheries 329
of the different contributions is provided in table 8. All applications address the
short-run behavior of the firm that maximizes revenue during the fishing trip, as-
suming fixed input composition.
Combining the dual approach with rationing theory offers a basis for predicting
the implications of quantity restriction. For the unregulated firm, output supply and
other production decisions are based on exogenous prices. Imposing output regula-
tion binds the output supply of the firm. Therefore, in order to determine the
consequences of production quotas for the unregulated firm, the ex ante assessment
should transform the quantity restriction into a price restriction. Using the frame-
work of a virtual price, the output constraint is transformed into an equivalent price
constraint (see Neary and Roberts 1980). The virtual price, ϕ i, is defined as the price
that would induce an unconstrained firm to behave in the same manner as when fac-
ing an output constraint. In this sense, the methodology considers how a primal
constraint is translated into a dual constraint.
Various implications of the trip quotas are considered. Squires and Kirkley
(1991) looked at how a trip quota on a single output impacts the production condi-
tions of the multiproduct firm. Two aspects are dealt with. First, they considered the
impact of a trip quota on the multiple output supply of the firm. Secondly, they ex-
amined the extent to which the trip quota shifts a firm’s output supply curve, thereby
reducing effort and the supply of all outputs. Campbell and Nicholl (1995) consid-
ered similar problems in the context of price restriction that are more immediate to
employ in a dual setting.
Segerson and Squires (1993) identify the consequences of production quotas on
the capacity utilization of the multiproduct firm. This is accomplished by using the
virtual price combined with the shadow value of the quasi-fixed input to measure
impact on capacity utilization. Their results show that output quotas on individual
species will not necessarily lead to disincentives for investment. For outputs with
large revenue shares, output regulation will have strong disinvestment incentives.
On the other hand, production quotas for outputs that have small revenue shares do
not seem to induce any disinvestment incentives. The result is consistent with the
findings of Segerson and Squires (1995) that the impact of price change on capacity
utilization is critically dependent on the revenue share of the output relative to the
shadow cost of the quasi-fixed input.
Squires and Kirkley (1995, 1996) contribute by making an ex ante assessment
of ITQ regulation imposed simultaneously on several outputs. The success of intro-
ducing ITQ management on various species is critically dependent on whether the
technology embodies nonjointness in inputs. Under conditions of nonjointness in in-
Table 8
Applications Using Ex ante Assessment of Production Quota on Firms
Contribution Addressing the
Study Gear Functional Form Impact of Trip Quota on:
Squires and Kirkley (1991) Trawl Leontief revenue A single output for (a) the reorganization
of output supply, (b) demand of effort.
Segerson and Squires (1993) Trawl Leontief revenue A single output for (c) incentives to
invest in quasi-fixed inputs.
Squires and Kirkley (1995) Trawl Leontief revenue Several outputs for (d) aggregated
rents and gains from quota trading.
Squires and Kirkley (1996) Trawl Leontief revenue Several outputs for (e) equilibrium
market price for trade transferable
quotas.Jensen 330
puts, the ITQ markets for multiple outputs can be managed separately for each out-
put. Introducing ITQ management when the technology embodies jointness in inputs
involves the problem that ITQ management does not meet the criterion of optimal
market clearance in all markets. This means that well-functioning ITQ markets for
each species will not necessarily be found. Squires and Kirkley emphasize that a
necessary condition for well-functioning ITQ markets exists if the marginal rate of
transformation between outputs is equal to the relative ITQ market prices. However,
given that ITQ markets do not necessarily match the product transformation of the
firms, this brings up the problem that species managed by ITQs will not be fully ex-
ploited. This is the case in the study of the ITQ management of sablefish and
thornyheads in the Pacific coast trawler fishery, where sablefish are underfished un-
der ITQ management. The result is not surprising given the technological feature of
the trawlers, which are characterized by their ability to shift target species. ITQ
management predetermines that the trawlers will target thornyheads, rendering them
unable to fully utilize their technological potential in sablefish fishery (an example
of the Le Chatelier effect). Therefore, underexploitation of sablefish implies that the
potential welfare gain of the sablefish fishery is not fully obtained.22 On the other
hand, if sablefish and thornyheads are produced in separate production functions,
jointness in inputs would not cause problems of underexploitation and incomplete
exploitation of potential benefits of ITQ regulation.23
Summary
The survey shows that the dual approach is very suitable for providing knowledge of
the disaggregated production structures in fisheries based on a positive analysis and
the theory of the firm. The dual approach reveals information about various aspects
of fish harvesting such as the firm’s supply and transformation between outputs, in-
put demand and substitution between inputs, long-run investment intentions, and the
estimation of welfare gains by introducing ITQ management in fisheries.
In general, caution should be expressed when drawing inference based on case
studies across different harvesting technologies and fishing regions. This follows be-
cause technological conditions are critically dependent on the specific
characteristics of fishing gear, fishing areas, harvesting conditions, range of species,
etc. Bearing this in mind, however, some general technological features of various
gear types and regulatory regimes, based on the present survey, are outlined.
Most applications are devoted to analyses of the technological conditions in
trawl fisheries. The applications reveal that the trawl is a highly flexible gear be-
cause trawlers have the ability to alter harvesting strategy in order to cope with
different species. Most trawl gear embodies jointness in inputs and economies of
scope, the latter meaning that cost complementarity exists in harvesting several spe-
cies. On the other hand, multiproduct economies of scale are seldom found for trawl
gear. In a management setting, the consequences of output regulation are not easy to
assess because trawlers are capable of altering their harvest composition. In this
sense, it is beneficial for the regulator to assess the spillover effects that regulating a
single species will have on other species. A certain degree of success of input manage-
ment in reducing the fishing effort of trawlers is indicated because complementarity
22 The gains by introducing ITQ management arise, as firms will reallocate their fishing activity to the
most favorable periods of the year. Moreover, economic rent will also arise, since the most efficient ves-
sels will purchase quota from less efficient vessels.
23 Vestergaard (1999) develops the framework to measure welfare effects of individual quotas in
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in the use of individual input components is found. On the other hand, input-output
separability implies that input management induces trawlers to alter their harvest
composition.
The few studies of gill net fisheries find that the technology is rather inflexible.
This is first and foremost because of a lack of ability to switch between species. Gill
netters harvest a variety of species, but individual species are harvested as comple-
ments or in fixed scale output. Therefore, output management of individual species
will not cause significant problems of external increases in the gill netters’ catches
of other species. Discarding regulated species is a natural reaction of gill netters in
coping with output management. However in general, gill netters are vulnerable to
output management, because this form of regulation might require them to reduce
fishing effort to satisfy output regulations, resulting in significant economic losses.
Most applications address technological conditions in fisheries, where input or
output management do not impose behavioral restrictions on firms. Even so, inter-
esting policy implications result from these applications.
Success of input management depends on whether firms, through the disaggre-
gated structure of fishing effort, have the ability to increase the use of unregulated
inputs or not. The survey indicates that for many technologies, complementary rela-
tionships between inputs are found, thereby offering some hope of reducing fishing
mortality through input management. However, some obstacles to effective input
management do exist. For example, productivity growth and technological refine-
ments mean that input management should currently be adjusted to take dynamic
developments in technology into account. Moreover, decommissioning schemes are
often suggested as a good means of reducing fishing capacity. The success of the
schemes depends on whether the fishing capacity is being fully exploited or not. Ad-
dressing incentives for adjustment of capacity by means of a test of capacity
utilization might, therefore, be useful. This follows because it is important to avoid
incomplete capacity utilization at the firm level, because this means that decommis-
sioning funds are granted to reduce the number of vessels without any reduction in
fishing mortality. In addition, significant welfare losses due to the inefficient com-
position of fishing fleets are indicated by the dual applications.
Assessment of output regulation on specialized technologies is relatively easy to
make. This is because separate production functions are employed for different spe-
cies, so that there are no spillover effects of regulation between species. However,
most technologies such as trawling, gill netting, and seiners are multispecies fishing
gears. This means that output regulation on individual species will have spillover ef-
fects on other species, implying external effects on fleet segments that exploit these
other species. Moreover, it is emphasized in dual applications that output regulation
impacts the cost conditions of the harvesting firms. In this sense, imposed output
regulation might distort the economies of scope, thereby leading to cost inefficiency
in the fishery.
Dual applications show that significant efficiency gains can be obtained by a
transition from unregulated or limited-access fishery to ITQ-managed fishery. The
transformation is most easily performed in the management of single species that is
exploited by specialized firms, where production is nonjoint in inputs and
diseconomies of scope offer no cost advantages in harvesting several species. How-
ever, as this survey indicates, most technologies are devoted to multispecies produc-
tion characterized by jointness in inputs. This means that imposing ITQ management
on individual species requires firms to minimize harvesting costs, and the presence
of economies of scope implies that firms also have incentives to harvest other spe-
cies. As a result, the option of imposing ITQ management of several species simul-
taneously is addressed. Various applications suggest that efficiency gains in intro-
ducing ITQ management of several species might also be obtained.Jensen 332
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